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Digital signatures guarantee the authorship of electronic communications. Currently used “clas-
sical” signature schemes rely on unproven computational assumptions for security, while quantum
signatures rely only on the laws of quantum mechanics. Previous quantum signature schemes have
used unambiguous quantum measurements. Such measurements, however, sometimes give no result,
reducing the efficiency of the protocol. Here, we instead use heterodyne detection, which always
gives a result, although there is always some uncertainty. We experimentally demonstrate feasibility
in a real environment by distributing signature states through a noisy 1.6 km free-space channel.
Our results show that continuous-variable heterodyne detection improves the signature rate for this
type of scheme and therefore represents an interesting direction in the search for practical quantum
signature schemes.
Digital signatures [1] are ubiquitous in electronic com-
munication, used in, for example, e-mail and digital
banking. They guarantee the provenance, integrity and
transferability of messages. Currently used classical digi-
tal signature schemes, however, rely on unproven compu-
tational assumptions [2], and may become insecure espe-
cially if quantum computers can be built [3]. Quantum
digital signatures (QDS)[4–10], on the other hand, give
information-theoretic security [7], loosely speaking based
on the fact that non-orthogonal quantum states cannot
be perfectly distinguished from each other.
The first quantum signature schemes assumed tamper-
proof, “authenticated” quantum communication links.
Intuitively, this could be accomplished using parameter
estimation techniques similar to those used in quantum
key distribution (QKD). How to achieve this was explic-
itly shown only recently [10, 11]. In addition, recent
quantum signature schemes [6, 9], including our protocol,
do not require long-term quantum memory. Importantly,
this means that quantum signatures can be implemented
with current technology, essentially similar to QKD se-
tups. “Classical” signature schemes with information-
theoretic security also exist [12–14], but rely on secret
shared keys, which could be accomplished using QKD.
Quantum signature schemes have some advantages over
such classical schemes [11], but exactly what signature
schemes are the most efficient remains an open problem.
Since messages may be forwarded between recipients, a
signature protocol has at least three parties, a sender Al-
ice and two recipients Bob and Charlie. In QKD, the
communicating parties Alice and Bob are assumed to
be honest. In signature protocols, however, any of the
involved parties could be dishonest. Signature schemes
should be secure against forging (with high probability,
only messages sent by Alice should be accepted) and
against repudiation (it is unlikely that Alice could suc-
cessfully deny having sent a message that she did send).
Repudiation is closely related to message transferability.
Transferability means that it is unlikely that one recipi-
ent accepts a message as genuine, but that this message
then is rejected if it is forwarded to another recipient.
If there is no trusted third party, one way to settle dis-
putes is by majority voting. For three parties, which is
the case we will consider, non-repudiation and message
transferability then become equivalent.
In principle, quantum signature schemes are based on
a “quantum one-way function” which maps classical in-
formation (a “private key”) to non-orthogonal quantum
states (a “public key”) [7]. In the simplest case, Alice
wants to be able to later on send a one-bit message “0”
or “1”. For longer messages, the scheme could be suitably
iterated. Generically, signature schemes have a distribu-
tion stage, where the scheme is set up, and a messaging
stage, when messages are sent and received. The distri-
bution stage could be compared to leaving a sample of
a handwritten signature e.g. when first opening a bank
account. The messaging stage typically takes place much
later. In our quantum signature scheme, the messaging
stage is entirely “classical”.
In the distribution stage, Alice selects sequences of
quantum states, one sequence for each possible future
message “0” and “1”. The states in the sequences are se-
lected from some set of non-orthogonal quantum states.
The classical information about what states Alice has se-
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2lected forms her “private keys” for the possible messages
“0” or “1”. The quantum state sequences are the corre-
sponding “public keys”. Alice then sends copies of the
“public key” sequences to Bob and Charlie, who mea-
sure the states they receive. Since it is impossible to per-
fectly discriminate non-orthogonal quantum states, Bob
and Charlie, or any other party, can never obtain full
information about Alice’s “private keys”.
Later on, in the messaging stage, when Alice wants to
send a message to Bob or Charlie, she sends the mes-
sage together with the corresponding “private key”. The
recipient of a message checks that the appended private
key sufficiently well matches the measurement results he
obtained in the distribution stage for the respective mes-
sage. In a real implementation, there will be mismatches
even for a private key sent by an honest Alice. However,
if imperfections are not too high, then anyone other than
Alice would cause a higher level of mismatches than Al-
ice. This guarantees security against message forging.
Similarly, to forward a message, a recipient forwards
the message together with its private key, received from
Alice, and the new recipient checks for mismatches with
his measurement record. Related to this, Bob and Char-
lie also need to ensure that Alice cannot cheat, which
would mean that she could make them disagree about
the validity of a message. They achieve this by some
kind of symmetrization procedure, done in the distribu-
tion stage [7, 8, 15]. In our protocol, as in [15], Bob and
Charlie randomly forward half of their obtained measure-
ment results to each other using a classical communica-
tion channel, secret from Alice. This channel could be
realized using standard quantum key distribution. To
ensure that Alice is unlikely to make Bob and Charlie
disagree about the validity of a signature, the thresh-
old for accepting a message directly from Alice should
be stricter than for accepting a forwarded message. For
more details see [16].
In this paper, we implement a quantum signa-
ture scheme using continuous variable (CV) heterodyne
quantum measurements. Previous quantum signature
schemes [5, 6, 17] have instead used unambiguous quan-
tum measurements. We demonstrate that our scheme is
viable in a noisy environment using a free-space urban
optical communication link. Finally, we show that, even
when experimental imperfections are taken into account,
this scheme outperforms a recent scheme that uses un-
ambiguous state elimination measurements [17].
Our QDS scheme is represented in Fig. 1, with the
protocol described below. The stages in the text corre-
spond to the respective numbers in the figure. We use
a discrete set of CV states, four phase-encoded coher-
ent states |α〉, |iα〉, | − α〉, | − iα〉, and heterodyne CV
measurements [18]. These same states were also used in
previous QDS schemes [5, 6, 17] and are similar to those
used in some types of CV QKD [19, 20]. In [5, 6, 17], how-
ever, recipients made “discrete” quantum measurements
with error-free (unambiguous) results, at the expense of
sometimes obtaining no result. Here we instead perform
FIG. 1: Depiction of the scheme. The numbered parts re-
late to the corresponding stages in the main text. Green
dashed lines indicate classical communication. Red lines in-
dicate communication with quantum states.
heterodyne measurements, which always give a result, at
the expense of increased errors in the results. In many
cases, unambiguous results are required for a protocol to
perform efficiently [21, 22]. Surprisingly, we find that for
this particular QDS protocol, heterodyne measurements
provide an advantage.
Distribution stage: 1-4
1. For each possible future one-bit message k = 0, 1, Al-
ice generates two identical copies of sequences of phase-
encoded coherent states, QuantSigk = ⊗Ll=1|ψkl 〉〈ψkl |,
where |ψkl 〉 is a randomly chosen phase-encoded coher-
ent state, |ψkl 〉 = |αeiφ
k
l 〉, φkl ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}, and
L is a suitably chosen integer. The state QuantSigk is
called the quantum signature, and the sequence of phases
PrivKeyk = (φ
k
1 , ...φ
k
L) is called the private key.
2. Alice sends one copy of QuantSigk to Bob and one to
Charlie, for each possible message k = 0 and k = 1.
3. Bob (Charlie) measures the states received from Alice
by performing a heterodyne detection [18, 23] of the xˆ-
and pˆ-quadrature. He records the result of the measure-
ment and the associated position in the sequence l. For
each quadrature, the sign of the measured result deter-
mines which state is eliminated. For example if a positive
result is measured, then the state |−α〉 or |− iα〉 is elim-
inated, depending on the measured quadrature. In this
way, Bob (Charlie) eliminates two states, one for each
quadrature, for each signature element.
4. Symmetrization: Bob (Charlie), for each element l of
QuantSigk, randomly chooses with equal probability to
either forward the measurement results and position to
Charlie (Bob) or not, secret from Alice, who should not
learn the positions of the forwarded results. The resulting
sequences of measurement outcomes, after the forwarding
procedure, form Bob’s and Charlie’s “eliminated signa-
tures”. Bob (Charlie) keeps the results obtained directly
from Alice, and the results forwarded to him by Charlie
(Bob) separate. Therefore, he has an eliminated signa-
ture in two parts, each of length L/2.
Homodyne measurements will, even in the ideal case,
3FIG. 2: Signature length for α = 0.48. Blue curve: theoret-
ical model. Blue dots/bars: results from the data attributed
to Bob. Red triangles/bars: results from the data attributed
to Charlie. The error bars calculated are derived by inves-
tigating the standard deviation of ten subsets of the entire
dataset. The errors naturally increase with decreasing trans-
mission since g from Eq. (1) decreases. In addition, less data
was available at lower transmission values (see histogram of
signals received by Bob per transmission sub-channel as in-
set). The data used for each point comes from a small range
of transmissions, but horizontal error bars are omitted for
clarity.
sometimes eliminate the sent state. If everybody fol-
lows the protocol, the probability for this depends on
the overlap of the coherent states, and would be equal
to 12erfc
(
α/
√
2
)
in the ideal case with no loss or exper-
imental imperfections, where erfc(x) is the complemen-
tary error function. For α = 0, this probability equals one
half, and quickly approaches zero as α increases. Due to
the unavoidable errors, this measurement protocol is an
example of “ambiguous state elimination”. Since mea-
surements are performed immediately on receipt of the
states, no quantum memory is required, just as in [6, 9].
Messaging stage: 5-7
5. To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends
(m,PrivKeym) to Bob.
6. Bob checks whether (m,PrivKeym) matches both
parts of his stored eliminated signature by counting how
many elements of Alice’s private key were eliminated dur-
ing the distribution stage. If there are fewer than saL/2
mismatches in each of the two parts of his eliminated
signature, where sa is the authentication threshold, Bob
accepts the message.
7. If Bob wishes to forward a message, he forwards the
message and its corresponding private key. Charlie tests
for mismatches in the same way as Bob, but with a higher
verification threshold sv, to protect against repudiation.
Charlie accepts the message if there are fewer than svL/2
mismatches in each of the two parts of his eliminated
signature, with perr < sa < sv <
1
2 .
In essence, the security of this scheme comes from two
sources. First, it is impossible for a forger to perfectly
determine the private key, since the used quantum states
are non-orthogonal. If noise is sufficiently low, the dis-
tributor Alice has an advantage over any other party.
Second, the forwarding of measurement results ensures
that, from Alice’s point of view, Bob’s and Charlie’s mea-
surement records follow the same statistics. This means
that if Charlie uses a higher verification threshold sv than
Bob’s authentication threshold sa, then Alice’s probabil-
ity to repudiate can be made arbitrarily small by choosing
the signature length L large enough. An upper bound on
the repudiation probability is calculated using the Ho-
effding inequality [24] in the supplemental material [16].
Security against collective attacks follows from the fact
that different signature states are completely uncorre-
lated, meaning that the optimal collective attack is an
individual attack on each signature element [6]. Secu-
rity against coherent attacks is left for future work, not-
ing that due to the forwarding of measurement results
amongst other things [25], methods from the security of
QKD cannot be directly carried over. Security against
coherent attacks has nevertheless been analysed for a
related quantum signature protocol [11, 15]. We also
assume that there are authenticated quantum channels
between Alice, Bob and Charlie. Some kind of parame-
ter estimation procedure should be used to replace this
assumption, analogous to [10, 11].
To successfully forge, Bob must guess a sequence of
states that meets Charlie’s verification threshold. For
individual and collective forging, the optimal forging at-
tack is to perform a minimum-cost measurement on the
individual signature states [25]. The minimum cost Cmin
is the minimum probability that an honest party will de-
tect an error in an individual signature element coming
from the forger, and is calculated in the supplemental
material [16]. As long as Cmin is larger than perr, which
denotes the probability of a mismatch with the sent sig-
nature when all parties are honest, the signature scheme
can be made secure by appropriately choosing other pro-
tocol parameters such as the length L. Note that perr
is determined from experimental data. A final condition
for a useful QDS scheme is that it must be robust, i.e.
it must succeed with high probability if all parties are
honest.
The exact security definitions can vary and depend on
whether one party is more likely to be dishonest than the
others. As detailed in the supplemental material [16], we
set protocol parameters so that the repudiation probabil-
ity, the forging probability and the failure probability are
all approximately equal. In this way, the probability that
the scheme will fail in any one of these ways is bounded
by
P (failure) ≤ 2 exp
(
−g
2
16
L
)
, (1)
where g = Cmin − perr is the advantage that the legiti-
mate sender Alice has over a forger for a single position
of the signature sequence [16, 17]. Since the failure prob-
ability decays exponentially with the signature length L,
the scheme is secure, and any required security level can
be achieved with sufficiently large L. The figure of merit
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FIG. 3: Black (solid) curve: Signature length for an ideal am-
biguous measurement scheme. Red (dotted) curve: Signature
length for an ambiguous measurement scheme with realistic
imperfections. Blue (dot-dashed) curve: Signature length for
an ideal unambiguous measurement scheme.
we use to characterise the quality of our QDS schemes is
the length 2L required to sign a one-bit message with a
failure probability of 0.01%.
To show the robustness of the protocol, the experiment
was carried out over a real free-space urban link [26, 27].
The signal states |±α〉, |±iα〉 were then repeatedly trans-
mitted, polarization multiplexed with the local oscilla-
tor, which is needed for later detection, through a free-
space channel between the buildings of the Max Planck
Institute and the University of Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg [26–
28]. The length of the channel is approximately 1.6 km.
The channel transmission fluctuated between 50 % and
85 % due to beam wandering and scintillation. At the
receiver the signal was split on a balanced beam splitter
to measure both the xˆ and pˆ quadratures. Simultane-
ously, the transmission was recorded for each state (for
more details see [16]). The experiment was implemented
for three different signal amplitudes, α = 0.48, α = 0.93,
and α = 1.63, and we attribute the first (second) half
of the measurement time to Bob (Charlie). To remedy
the channel fading, Bob’s (Charlie’s) measurement data
is then sorted into 32 sub-channels according to the mea-
sured transmission [26, 27]. Depending on the sign of
the quadrature measurement values, for each signal state,
two of the possible sent states were eliminated.
For each set of data, the sequence of eliminated states
was used to produce a cost matrix [25] that gives the
probability that each state was eliminated for a particu-
lar signal state. For each cost matrix, we calculate the
minimum difference between an off-diagonal element of
the cost matrix (probability of eliminating a state that
was not sent) and the diagonal element of that row (prob-
ability of eliminating the sent state). This difference was
multiplied by the appropriate pmin to obtain the param-
eter g from (1) for that cost matrix. The minimum prob-
ability that a forger will incorrectly identify the state is
pmin (see [16]). For each g, the signature length 2L to
sign a one-bit message with a failure probability of 0.01%
was calculated. In Fig. 2, the length L is plotted against
transmission T with T+R=1 for α = 0.48.
To account for experimental imperfections, a theoreti-
cal model was developed, using only experimental data,
with no free parameters (for details see the supplemen-
tal material [16]). The larger errors bars in Fig. 2 are
mostly due to the statistical error of the smaller amount
of data available at lower transmission. The experiment
has a clock rate of about 2.2 MHz and the required signa-
ture length of about 105 is easily manageable in the sub-
channels; thus this demonstrates a viable QDS scheme.
The experiment was also carried out at α = 0.93 and
α = 1.63 (results given in [16]). Increasing α improves
the cost matrix but also decreases pmin, which makes the
guess of the forger easier. There is a trade-off between
these two effects, with the optimal α predicted to be α ≈
0.5, supported by the experimental results.
The main purpose of this experiment is as a test of the
measurement procedure used. A calculation of the cost
matrix provides all the information relevant for imple-
menting a full scheme. In the experiment, all the quan-
tum steps were carried out; the rest is classical commu-
nication and information processing. The experiment is
also the first to demonstrate a signature scheme in a free-
space setting, in contrast to previous experiments using
optical fibers.
It is important to compare the performance of this
scheme to previous results. In [17], a similar scheme
is presented, but with unambiguous state elimination
rather than the “continuous-variable ambiguous state
elimination” used here. There, the signature length re-
quired was about 109, for 500 m of optical fiber and a
total loss level of 35%. Comparing this to our results,
the signature length was about 7 × 104 with a similar
loss level and a 1.6 km free-space channel. In [17], the
experiment ran at a clock rate of 100 MHz, whereas the
clock rate of this experiment was 2.2 MHz. Increasing
the clock rate into the GHz range is straightforward with
available technology.
Fig. 3 shows the dependence of signature lengths from
transmission for the two schemes (details of the mod-
els given in [16]). Even including experimental errors,
our scheme requires a shorter signature than the ideal
result for [17]. That is, the QDS protocol based on am-
biguous state elimination has a fundamental advantage
over unambiguous state elimination. This advantage is
even more pronounced when experimental inefficiencies
are taken into account. Approximately one order of mag-
nitude of the advantage comes purely from the chosen
measurement, as shown in Fig. 3. The rest comes from
the improved technical performance of homodyne mea-
surements compared to single-photon detectors.
In conclusion, we have presented a QDS scheme that
uses CV homodyne measurements. We have experimen-
tally demonstrated that the scheme works over a fluc-
tuating free-space channel. In addition, the signature
rate per quantum state sent is orders of magnitude better
than previous work. Interestingly, despite the ambiguity
5in the measurements, this scheme has a fundamental ad-
vantage over corresponding schemes using unambiguous
measurements.
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This supplemental material is split into four sections. The first gives an intuitive picture of the
principle of QDS. The second section shows the security analysis for the digital signature scheme.
The third section gives details of the experiment and how the experimental graphs were calculated.
The fourth section describes how the theoretical models predicting the required signature lengths
were calculated.
I. PRINCIPLE OF QUANTUM SIGNATURES
Suppose Alice sends a message to Bob, who in turn
may pass it on to Charlie. How can Bob tell that the
message is from Alice, and has not been tampered with,
and how can Charlie tell that Bob did not modify or by
himself generate the message? If one is using a conven-
tional handwritten signature, then Alice has previously
distributed copies of her signature, and recipients com-
pare the signature on a document with the previously dis-
tributed signature sample. Quantum signature schemes
also have two stages, a distribution stage where sequences
of quantum states are distributed among the partici-
pants, and an entirely “classical” messaging stage, which
can occur much later, where Alice sends signed messages
to Bob or Charlie. In the type of scheme we will employ,
Alice distributes sequences of non-orthogonal quantum
states to the possible recipients Bob and Charlie, as sig-
natures for the possible future messages. The classical
information which fully describes these sequences can be
viewed as Alice’s “private keys”. Only Alice has exact
knowledge of these sequences, i.e. of the private keys.
Bob and Charlie, or any other malicious party, are only
able to obtain partial information about the quantum
states in these sequences, no matter what type of quan-
tum measurements they are using.
The simplest case is if Alice wants to later sign a one-
bit message, “0” or “1”. Alice then initially distributes
quantum state sequences corresponding to “0” and “1”,
that is, she distributes the quantum signatures for “0”
and “1”, respectively. In the messaging stage, if Alice
wants to communicate “0”, she sends the message to-
gether with the corresponding private key, that is, the
classical description of what states the corresponding se-
quence contained. Let us say that the recipient is Bob;
due to the non-orthogonality of the signature states, Bob
inevitably can obtain only partial information about the
private key, whether he is honest and performs the mea-
surements in the protocol or not. Therefore he only has
“noisy” information about the private key correspond-
ing to either “0” or “1”, no matter what measurement
procedure he uses. Note that here “noisy” refers both
to errors in identifying the states, and to any noise in
transmission line. The latter, however, can in principle
be avoided, whereas the former cannot be avoided even
in principle. Bob then checks Alice’s classical private
key (classical information about the sent quantum sig-
nature) against the measurement results he obtained in
the distribution stage, for the corresponding sequence of
quantum states. In practice, due to errors, Bob’s mea-
surement results will not perfectly match Alice’s private
key, but Bob accepts the message as coming from Alice
if the “distance” between his stored “noisy” information
and the private key is small enough. If Bob later wants
to forward the message, he forwards the message (“0”,
say) and the corresponding private key (that he received
from Alice) to Charlie, who tests the signature in the
same way as Bob. Importantly, Bob should be able to
know whether Charlie is likely to accept the message al-
ready when Bob performs his initial check of the signa-
ture, without at that point contacting Charlie.
Bob may try to cheat, that is, try to make Charlie ac-
cept a forged message as genuinely coming from Alice.
This he can do either if he has received no message from
Alice, or if he has received some other message from Al-
ice. For example, if Bob receives the message “0” and
corresponding private key from Alice, he may decide to
cheat and try to convince Charlie that Alice communi-
cated “1”. To do so, he would have to send the private
key corresponding to “1”, but this is not at his disposal.
Instead, in the signature protocol we are implementing,
all he can do is send a classical sequence based on the
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2measurement that he performed during the distribution
stage, which only gives a “noisy” copy of the private key
for “1”. He should choose the sequence that, as far as
Bob knows, is most likely to be accepted by Charlie as
coming from Alice. However, Bob’s noisy copy of the
private key and Charlie’s noisy private key for “1” are
different, because they are obtained from different mea-
surements. Therefore Charlie will detect a greater “noise
distance” between his own noisy private key and the one
he receives from Bob, than he would expect if the message
came from Alice. Therefore Charlie knows something is
wrong and rejects the message.
Alice can also try to cheat by sending a message that
Bob will accept but Charlie will reject, i.e., she can try to
send a non-transferable message. Bob and Charlie guard
against this by symmetrizing their noisy measurement
results for the private key, in the distribution stage. This
can be done, for example, by randomly swapping half
of their “noisy” measurement results with each other.
After this swapping, from Alice’s point of view, Bob’s and
Charlie’s measurement results follow the same statistics,
and therefore it is impossible for her to create a non-
transferable message, as long as Charlie uses a less strict
threshold for accepting the signed message than Bob.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS
To be considered a useful scheme, quantum digital sig-
natures (QDS) must be secure against both repudiation
and forgery. The scheme is secure if the probability that
the signature can be repudiated or forged decays expo-
nentially with the length of the key. In addition, the
scheme should be robust, which means that if all par-
ties behave as they should, the protocol runs as intended
with high probability. The analysis below follows the
same methods as in [1].
Security against repudiation: For successful repudia-
tion, Charlie must reject a message that Bob has al-
ready accepted. Due to the random swapping of measure-
ment results between Bob and Charlie, the measurement
statistics they share are symmetrical, which provides se-
curity against repudiation. No matter what cheating
strategy Alice adopts, including strategies involving en-
tangled states, this will result in Bob and Charlie having
the same probability p to observe a mismatch in the mes-
saging stage. Alice can adjust p, but this is all she can
do.
To achieve successful repudiation, Alice can manipu-
late the states sent to Bob and Charlie to try to cause
a disagreement between them. We give Alice full control
over the probability of a mismatch between the private
key and Bob’s (Charlie’s) eliminated signature. We call
the probability of a mismatch pB for states first sent to
Bob, and pC for states first sent to Charlie.
For successful repudiation, Bob must accept the mes-
sage for both parts of his signature, each of length L/2,
and Charlie has to reject the message for at least one part
of his signature. Since P (A∩B) ≤ min{P (A), P (B)} and
P (A ∪B) ≤ P (A) + P (B), we can write
prep = P ((A ∩B) ∩ (C ∪D))
≤ min{min{P (A), P (B)}, P (C) + P (D)}, (1)
where P (A) (P (B)) is the probability that Bob will ac-
cept the message using the L/2 states received from Alice
(Charlie), and P (C) (P (D)) is the probability that Char-
lie will reject the message due to the L/2 states received
from Bob (Alice).
Using Hoeffding’s inequalities [2], which bound the
probability that the empirical mean of L independent
random variables deviates from their expected mean, the
probabilities P (A) and P (B) that Bob will accept the
message, for the length L/2 parts of his eliminated sig-
nature received from Alice and Charlie respectively, are
P (A) ≤ exp[−(pB − sa)2L],
P (B) ≤ exp[−(pC − sa)2L],
(2)
where sa is the authentication threshold. Similarly, the
probabilities P (C) and P (D) that Charlie will reject the
message for the length L/2 parts of his eliminated signa-
ture received from Bob and Alice respectively are
P (C) ≤ exp[−(sv − pB)2L],
P (D) ≤ exp[−(sv − pC)2L],
(3)
where sv is the verification threshold and sv > sa.
Now we can take p = max{pB , pC}. In that case
exp[−(p − sa)2L] = min{P (A), P (B)}. In addition,
2 exp[−(sv − p)2L] ≥ P (C) + P (D). Combining these
two equations with Eq. (1), we get
prep ≤ min{2 exp[−(p−sa)2L], 2 exp[−(sv−p)2L]}, (4)
where the first term in the minimum has been doubled for
simplicity, noting that this slightly loosens the tightness
of the bound on the repudiation probability.
Alice’s optimal choice of p is the one that maximizes
the smaller of these two terms, that is, p = sa+sv2 . With
this choice, her repudiation probability is bounded as
prep ≤ 2 exp
[
− (sv − sa)
2
4
L
]
. (5)
This decays exponentially with the length of the signa-
ture and thus the scheme is secure against repudiation.
Security against forging: It is easier to forge a message
that is claimed to be forwarded, than one that is claimed
to come directly from Alice. Bounding the probability
for the former also bounds the probability for the latter.
Therefore, we will consider the case where Bob attempts
to forge a message which he is forwarding to Charlie,
claiming he received it from Alice. Since the protocol
is symmetric with respect to the two recipients Bob and
Charlie, this also bounds Charlie’s probability to forge
messages.
3To successfully forge, Bob must ensure that he doesn’t,
in the messaging stage, declare too many of the states
that Charlie has eliminated, with fewer than svL/2 errors
in each length L/2 part of Charlie’s eliminated signature.
Since Bob can control what he forwards to Charlie in the
distribution stage, Bob can completely control the num-
ber of mismatches for these positions. If he so wishes,
he can cause no mismatches in those positions. There-
fore it is the measurement results which Charlie did not
forward to Bob that Bob has to try to guess. The mea-
surement results Charlie received through Bob are used
to protect against repudiation, whereas the measurement
results Charlie obtained for states directly received from
Alice are used to test for forgery by Bob, and vice versa.
Assuming that Bob cannot interfere with the quantum
states which Alice sends to Charlie, Bob’s best forging
strategy will involve measurements on the copies of these
states which Bob legitimately received from Alice. Based
on this, Bob will make a best guess, when later declaring
to Charlie what these states supposedly were. The op-
timal measurement Bob should make to forge is limited
only by what is possible in quantum mechanics, not by
any considerations of what measurements are practical
to realize, and is not the same measurement as he would
make if honestly following the protocol. In general, one
should assume that Bob knows which measurement re-
sults Charlie will forward, and which ones he will keep to
himself, so that Bob can change his measurement strat-
egy accordingly for states in different positions.
The fact that the possible states Alice can send are
non-orthogonal provides the basis of the security of the
scheme. As in [3], the optimal individual measurement
Bob can perform is a minimum-cost measurement, min-
imising Bob’s “cost” associated with mismatches. Since
the states sent by Alice are uncorrelated with each other,
collective forging strategies, where measurements on suc-
cessive signature states can depend on the results ob-
tained in previous measurements, provide no advantage
over individual forging strategies, where Bob simply re-
peats the same optimal measurement for each signature
state [3]. The most general type of forging attack are
coherent forging attacks, where Bob can measure any
number of signature states in an entangled basis. While
intuitively the protocol should remain secure also against
coherent forging, this analysis is not in general straight-
forward. We therefore leave discussion of coherent forg-
ing attacks for future work, noting that it has been shown
that for BB84 signature states, coherent attacks provide
no advantage [4].
To prove security against individual and collective forg-
ing, we need to bound Bob’s minimum cost for a mea-
surement on an individual signature state, which in this
case is identical to Bob’s probability to cause a mismatch
for a single signature element. This is done following the
method in the supplemental material of [1], resulting in
a lower bound on the minimum cost Cmin, depending on
the cost matrix, which is determined from the experimen-
tal data, and pmin, which is the minimum probability for
Bob to incorrectly identify a state received from Alice.
pmin depends on the amplitude of the initial coherent
states, and can be shown to be [3]
pmin = 1− 1
16
|
4∑
i=1
√
λi|2, (6)
where λ1,2 = 2 exp(−α2)[cosh(α2)± cos(α2)] and λ3,4 =
2 exp(−α2)[sinh(α2) ± sin(α)2]. Here, we are assuming
that the forger Bob has access to the states Alice sends
before any losses or imperfections have acted on them.
This is not true for an honest Charlie, whose measure-
ments on the states is subject to loss and imperfections.
An example of a calculation of a bound for the minimum
cost for an experimental cost matrix is given in Section
2, and a calculation for a theoretical cost matrix is given
in Section 3.
The probability of a successful forgery is the proba-
bility that Charlie measures fewer than svL/2 errors in
the results for the L/2 states received directly from Alice
during forgery by Bob. Using Hoeffding’s inequalities,
the probability of a successful forgery is therefore
pforg ≤ exp
[−(Cmin − sv)2L] . (7)
This probability decays exponentially with respect to sig-
nature length as long as Cmin > sv.
Robustness: A QDS scheme is only useful if it only
fails with small probability. If all parties are honest, then
Bob should accept the message as being genuine, except
with small probability. The message is rejected if Bob
detects more than saL/2 errors in either of the length L/2
parts of his eliminated signature, which using Hoeffding’s
inequalities occurs with probability
pfail ≤ 2 exp
[−(sa − perr)2L] , (8)
where perr is the probability that an honest recipient,
following the protocol, will eliminate the state actually
sent by Alice. If, as is normally the case, perr for the
states sent to Charlie is different to that for those sent
to Bob, then perr should be taken as the maximum of
those probabilities. Since Charlie’s rejection threshold is
less strict than Bob’s, Charlie’s rejection probability is
smaller than Bob’s. For the protocol to be robust, we
thus have to choose sv > sa > perr.
Taking everything together, the protocol can be made
secure and robust as long as an honest Charlie is able to
distinguish a “fake” declaration by Bob from a declara-
tion made by Alice, in terms of the average number of
mismatches Charlie sees. This occurs when Bob’s opti-
mum probability to cause a mismatch, Cmin, is greater
than the probability perr that Alice’s true declaration
will cause a mismatch. As long as Cmin > perr holds,
the thresholds sv, sa and the signature length L can be
chosen so that the scheme is as secure as desired against
forging for all displacement amplitudes.
If we assume that all parties are equally likely to be
dishonest, then we can define the level of security by
4setting the terms in the exponentials of Eqs. (5), (7) and
(8) to be equal to each other. This is achieved when sa =
perr +(Cmin−perr)/4, and sv = perr +3(Cmin−perr)/4.
This gives an upper bound for the total probability for
the scheme to fail in any one of these ways of
P (failure) ≤ 2 exp
(
−g
2
16
L
)
, (9)
where g = Cmin − perr can be determined from experi-
mental results. The figure of merit we use to characterize
the quality of a QDS scheme is the length 2L required
to sign a one-bit message for a particular security level.
In this work, to facilitate comparison with earlier real-
izations [1, 3], the security level we choose is that the
probability of failure is ≤ 0.01%.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
For the signature state sequences we use four coherent
states |α〉, |iα〉, |−α〉, |−iα〉, which are symmetrically
distributed in quadrature phase space. In [5], we used
these same states to distribute and quantify effective en-
tanglement between Alice and Bob. At the receiver, we
measure both the xˆ and the pˆ quadrature using a het-
erodyne measurement. The signal is split at a balanced
beam splitter, and homodyne detectors are used at both
outputs. In particular, in each homodyne measurement,
we mix a strong local oscillator with the signal on a bal-
anced beam splitter, and measure the resulting difference
signal of two PIN photodiodes, built into a homemade
detector. To achieve a high detection efficiency at the
receiver we send the local oscillator (LO) together with
the signal states, polarization multiplexed, through the
1.6 km free space channel. This can be described using
Stokes operators [6].
At Alice’s end, we use a grating-stabilized diode laser
at 809 nm wavelength (Toptica DL 100). The output
of this laser is spatially mode-cleaned by a single-mode
fiber, and a small part of the output power is used in
a balanced self-homodyning setup to monitor the shot
noise-limited operation of the laser. The remaining part
is used to prepare the actual signals and also the local
oscillator. The polarization is cleaned by a polarizing
beam splitter (PBS) and then adjusted to be circularly
polarized (〈Sˆ1〉 = 〈Sˆ2〉 = 0) using a quarter-wave plate
(QWP). Then we use two sequences of half-wave plates
(HWP) and electro-optical modulators (EOM, Thorlabs,
EO-AM-NR-C1, 600-900 nm, bandwidth 100 MHz) to
produce the four signal states in the S1-S2-plane. In
terms of Stokes operators this leads to a bright +S3-
polarized local oscillator (which is essentially not affected
by the signal modulation) and the signal states |α〉, |iα〉,
|−α〉, |−iα〉, which are orthogonally (i.e. −S3-) polar-
ized. Therefore the EOMs are driven by two individual
arbitrary waveform generators (Agilent 33250A) that are
synchronized with each other. They are used to produce
Gaussian-shaped modulation voltages with peak voltage
in the mV range, leading to signal amplitudes in the
range of a few shot-noise units. After each Gaussian-
shaped pulse, the output voltage is set to zero for the
same time period. This is used as the vacuum reference
for the signal states. The repetition rate of the produced
signal states is 3.05 MHz. After 263 signal pulses, we in-
crease the peak voltage of one pulse to produce a trigger
signal for synchronization between Alice and Bob (Char-
lie). To avoid any influence of the bright trigger pulse
onto the quantum signals, we disregard the 92 following
signal pulses. This leads to an effective sending rate of
2.22 MHz. At the sender, the signal preparation is either
verified, or the beam is expanded to a beam width of
approximately 4 cm and sent through an optical window
followed by the free-space channel to Bob (Charlie). The
signal measurement at Alice, used to adjust and confirm
the signal preparation, uses a balanced beam splitter to
split the signals in two equal parts. They are mixed with
the polarization-multiplexed LO on a PBS. The phase
of the LO can in this case be adjusted using a HWP,
while a QWP is used to compensate for static polariza-
tion offsets. The outputs of the PBS are detected with
two PIN photodiodes and the difference signal of these
are amplified in a homemade detector. By this we are
able to simultaneously measure the S1 (xˆ quadrature)
observable and the S2 (pˆ quadrature) observable. The
overall detection efficiency, including optical losses and
the diodes’ quantum efficiencies, is 0.84±0.02. The elec-
tronic signal is high-pass filtered (Minicircuits BLK-89-
S+, 100 kHz) and analogue-to-digital-converted with an
oscilloscope at a sampling rate of 250 Msamples/s. Thus
each signal pulse is 41 samples long, followed by 41 sam-
ples of vacuum. The linearity of the detection system
was confirmed by an attenuation measurement without
signal modulation.
At Bob (Charlie) we use a telescope with a receiving
aperture of 150 mm to catch as much as possible of the
incoming beam and reduce its beam width for further
processing. First we split 5% from the beam with an un-
balanced beam splitter, to record the channel transmis-
sion, which was between 50% and 85% during our mea-
surements. The remaining received signal is measured in
exactly the same manner as at Alice’s site. Here the over-
all detection efficiency including optical losses and the
diodes’ quantum efficiencies is 0.83 ± 0.02. The experi-
ment was implemented with three different signal peak
voltages leading to the average signal sizes α = 0.48,
α = 0.93, and α = 1.63. The S1 signals are slightly re-
duced compared to the S2 signals, as we use the same
modulation voltages but produce the S1 signals first.
Thus they are attenuated by the second EOM which has
a transmittance of 95%. We attribute the first (second)
half of the overall measurement time to Bob (Charlie).
As already mentioned in the main article Bob’s (Char-
lie’s) measurement data is then sorted in 32 sub-channels,
according to the measured transmission. Depending on
the sign of the quadrature measurement values, for each
5signal state two of the possibly sent states were elimi-
nated. For example, in the case of a positive S1 (S2)
measurement value, |−α〉 (|−iα〉) is eliminated.
For each α and transmission bin, the knowledge of the
sent state was combined with the eliminated states to
produce a cost matrix that gives the probability that each
state was eliminated for each sent state. The rows of the
matrix correspond to the states sent by Alice, in the order
|α〉, |iα〉, |−α〉, |−iα〉. The columns correspond to the
states eliminated by Bob in the same order. The diagonal
elements therefore give the probability that the sent state
is eliminated. An example of the measured cost matrix
is shown below, with errors. The errors are calculated by
dividing the available dataset in 10 equal sized parts and
calculating the respective cost matrix and their standard
deviation. Thus the errors give an upper bound for the
statistical error and possibly drifting systematic errors.
This matrix is Bob’s data for α = 0.48 at a transmission
level of T = 0.600 (T+R=1) and is given by
C =
 0.3767 0.5028 0.6233 0.49720.4929 0.3682 0.5071 0.63180.5979 0.496 0.4021 0.504
0.4957 0.6204 0.5043 0.3796

±
 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.0190.008 0.013 0.008 0.0130.013 0.019 0.013 0.019
0.014 0.020 0.014 0.020
 . (10)
The relevant cost matrix can be used to bound the min-
imum cost of a minimum-cost measurement performed
by a forger, by following the method in the supplemental
material of [3].
To find an analytical bound on the minimum cost, we
manipulate the cost matrix in Eq. (10) to the form of
an error-type cost matrix. We do this because the mini-
mum cost of an error-type cost matrix is proportional to
pmin, the minimum probability to incorrectly identify the
state, with the proportionality given by the off-diagonal
elements of the cost matrix. An error-type cost matrix
has zeros on the diagonals of the cost matrix, and all the
off-diagonal terms are equal. It is called error-type be-
cause a correct declaration has zero cost, and an incorrect
declaration always has the same cost.
To get to this form, we use two properties of cost ma-
trices. First, subtracting a constant-row matrix from a
cost matrix reduces the cost by a constant, while leaving
the minimum-cost measurement unchanged. Second, the
cost of a cost matrix Ci,j is bounded from below by the
cost of a cost matrix Cli,j that is strictly smaller than it
Cli,j ≤ Ci,j .
We define Chi,j = Ci,i, a constant-row matrix for
which the elements in each row are equal to the di-
agonal elements of the matrix Ci,j . We then define
C ′i,j = Ci,j − Chi,j , which has the same minimum-cost
measurement as Ci,j , but with the minimum cost reduced
by Ch = 1/4
∑
i Ci,i. Finally we define the cost matrix
Cli,j that is strictly smaller than C
′
i,j for all i, j such that
Cli,j = mini 6=j C
′
i,j for all i 6= j, and with zeros on the
diagonal. This final cost matrix Cli,j is of error-type,
for which the minimum cost Clmin is proportional to the
minimum error probability pmin. Using this argument
we can lower bound the minimum cost of the cost matrix
(10) as
Cmin ≥ Ch + Clmin. (11)
Starting from (10), the subsequent cost matrices are
Ch =
 0.3767 0.3767 0.3767 0.37670.3682 0.3682 0.3682 0.36820.4021 0.4021 0.4021 0.4021
0.3796 0.3796 0.3796 0.3796
 , (12)
C ′ =
 0 0.1261 0.2466 0.12050.1247 0 0.1389 0.26360.1958 0.0939 0 0.1019
0.1161 0.2408 0.1247 0
 , (13)
Cl =
 0 0.0939 0.0939 0.09390.0939 0 0.0939 0.09390.0939 0.0939 0 0.0939
0.0939 0.0939 0.0939 0
 . (14)
From (12), Ch = 0.3817. This is the cost for an honest
scenario; it is the probability that Charlie will eliminate
a state that Alice sent if all parties are honest. From
(14), the minimum difference between the probability of
eliminating the sent state, and the probability of elimi-
nating another state is 0.0939. This difference therefore
gives the advantage of declaring the sent state at the
messaging stage. The minimum cost for matrix (14) is
the product of that advantage and the minimum proba-
bility to incorrectly identify a state pmin. For this state
α = 0.48, so from (6), pmin = 0.4373. The minimum cost
of the matrix Ci,j is finally
Cmin = 0.3817 + 0.0939× 0.4373 = 0.42276, (15)
and the parameter g used to calculate the signature
length is
g = Cmin − Ch = 0.04106. (16)
This corresponds to a required signature length of L =
94000 for a security level of 0.01%. In Figs. 1 and 2, we
plot similarly calculated signature lengths as a function
of the channel transmission, for α = 0.93 and α = 1.63.
The graph for α = 0.48 is already included in the main
paper.
In all experimental graphs, errors in the signature
length were calculated using the statistical errors of the
elements in the cost matrices. The errors in the length
were calculated by first adding the errors of the diagonal
elements, and subtracting the errors of the off-diagonal
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FIG. 1: Signature length for α = 0.93. Blue curve: theoret-
ical model. Blue dots/bars: results from the data attributed
to Bob. Red dots/bars: results from the data attributed to
Charlie. The error bars calculated are statistical.
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FIG. 2: Signature length for α = 1.63. Blue curve: theoret-
ical model. Blue dots/bars: results from the data attributed
to Bob. Red dots/bars: results from the data attributed to
Charlie. The error bars calculated are statistical.
elements. This gives a new cost matrix C ′ from which a
new parameter g′ can be calculated as above, with g′ < g.
This new g′ is then used to calculate a new length L′ > L
that is the worst-case scenario for the required signature
length. The length L′ is taken as the top of the error bar
in the experimental graph.
Second, the error bars in the diagonal elements are
subtracted, and the errors in the off-diagonal elements
are added to give a new cost matrix C ′′ that has a new
parameter g′′ > g. This new g′′ is then used to calculate
a new length L′′ < L that gives a best-case scenario for
the required signature length. The length L′′ is used for
the bottom of the error bar in the experimental graph.
Note, that to ensure the required security when run-
ning a full signature protocol, the longest length L′
should be used for the signature length, as this is the
worst-case scenario. This means it is important to mini-
mize the errors in the cost matrix by taking a large num-
ber of measurements to calculate the cost matrix. In this
experiment, insufficient data was available at some trans-
mission levels, which led to the large error bars seen.
IV. THEORETICAL MODELS
In Fig. 3 of the main paper, the required signature
length required with respect to transmission T for three
different theoretical models is shown. Here we describe
how those curves were calculated.
The black (lower) curve shows the case where hetero-
dyne detection is used by the honest recipients and there
are no experimental imperfections. In this case, the ideal
cost matrix is
C =
 perr 1/2 1− perr 1/21/2 perr 1/2 1− perr1− perr 1/2 perr 1/2
1/2 1− perr 1/2 perr
 , (17)
where perr =
1
2erfc
(√
T
2 α
)
. From this cost matrix, the
minimum cost is bounded as described for the experimen-
tal cost matrix in the previous section. In this way, the
minimum cost is found to be Cmin = perr+pmin(
1
2−perr),
and the parameter g is thus g = pmin(
1
2 − perr). Note
that the α used to calculate pmin is the unattenuated α
prepared by Alice. A higher g gives a shorter signature
length and therefore the optimal α is the one that gives
the highest g. In this case g is maximal when α ≈ 0.5.
The black curve calculated in Fig. 3 of the main paper
is plotted by fixing α = 0.5 and calculating L from the
resulting g.
The red (middle) curve in Fig. 3 of the main paper
shows the case where heterodyne detection is used by
the honest recipients and some experimental imperfec-
tions are taken into account. The experimental imper-
fections considered are imperfect detection efficiency, ad-
ditional variance introduced by the EOM that displaces
the coherent states, and electronic noise that increases
the variance at the measurement stage. When these im-
perfections are taken into account, the cost matrix is the
same as in Eq. (17), but with a new perr,
perr =
1
2
erfc
 12ηTα√
1
2ηT+ elect
 , (18)
where η is the detection efficiency,  is the additional
variance that comes in from the state prepartation and
elect is the electronic noise that increases the variance of
the states. In all experiments, η = 0.856 and  = 1.01,
and elect varies between 0.04 and 0.08. The value of elect
is determined from the measured variances of the states.
The theoretical model also takes into account the fact
that the modulation of the Stokes operators Sˆ1 and Sˆ2
had a slightly different amplitude. The lower amplitude
of Sˆ1 was used to calculate the guaranteed advantage
from the cost matrix, and the higher amplitude of Sˆ2 was
used to calculate pmin. The encoding always has some
phase imperfections, however, since this only has a small
effect on the signature length, it is not included in the
model for simplicity. The signature length is calculated
7from the cost matrix in the same way as for the black
curve, and the result is plotted in Fig. 3 of the main
paper. This model is the same one that was used to plot
the theoretical curve for Fig. 2 of the main paper and
Figs. 1 and 2 of the supplementary material.
The blue (upper) curve shows the case where single-
photon detection is used for unambiguous state elimina-
tion as in [3], and there are no experimental imperfec-
tions. This represents the optimum length achievable for
these states using unambiguous state elimination. In this
case the ideal cost matrix is
C =
 0 q p qq 0 q pp q 0 q
q p q 0
 , (19)
where
p = 1− exp(−|
√
Tα|2), q = 1− exp(−|
√
Tα|2/2).
From this, the minimum cost is bounded as before to
be Cmin = pminq. Since the diagonal elements are 0,
Cmin = g, and g is used to calculate the required signa-
ture length. Again, a higher g gives a shorter signature
length and therefore the optimal α is the one that gives
the highest g. The blue curve is plotted by using the op-
timal α at each level of transmission, which in this case
is α ≈ 0.7.
The black and blue curves can be compared to study
which measurement scheme is most efficient for this set
of states. They both assume ideal experimental condi-
tions and so remove any technical considerations. Since
the black curve is always lower than the blue curve, this
show that heterodyne detection has a fundamental ad-
vantage over single photon detection for this protocol.
In fact, even when taking into account realistic experi-
mental imperfections, the scheme based on heterodyne
detection performs better than the one based on single
photon detection could ever do.
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